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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
rnE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
V. 
GAYLE LEE BOONE, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 15275 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, GAYLE LEE BOONE, appeals from a conviction of 
l:nlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value in the 
T~ird Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Gayle Lee Boone, was charged with Unlawful 
Jistribution of a Controlled Substance for Value in violation of 
.'tah Code Ann. §58-37-S(a) (1953 as amended). On the 17th day of 
:~:ce, 1977, the appellant was found guilty of the offense as charged 
a jury Subsequen~ly, the appellant was sentenced to incarceration 
- the ;;rah State ?rison for the indeterminate term of zero to ten 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and 
judgment rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third 
Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the afternoon of April 27, 1977, Kayle Shaw, Junior 
contacted the appellant and arranged to meet with him later in that 
day at an establishment called "The Gym" (T. 21). At that time, 
Shaw was working as an undercover agent for the Utah State Liquor 
and Narcotics Enforcement Division (T.l70). Several months earlier 
Shaw had been released from the Salt Lake County Jail where he 
was being held pending trial on three counts of Aggravated Robbery, 
felonies of the first degree, and another felony charge of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute for 
Value (T.20). At the time of this action Shaw was still awaiting 
trial on those charges (T.20). 
Upon being released from jail Shaw reported to Tom Carleson 
of the Bountiful City Police Department (T.80). Carleson then 
introduced Shaw to agents of the State Liquor and ~arcotics 
Control Division (T.8l) and then put him to '..Jork as an ·.mdercover 
agent (T.l70). At that time Shaw told :he State agents that he 
'\;-anted to bust Ga:rle Boone" (T. 82). 
After contacting the ap8ellant on A8ril 
contacted the State ::a::-cotics T)ivisi:m ·..:he::-e ~.e :alkec :-=: -::'·.Jm Cd:~'' 
(T.26). Shaw then proceeded to :he T)i~isi2n's o~~i~e a: :~e 
' -~-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Fun ing for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~irgrounds where he was searched (T.26) and suoplied with one 
~~ousand dollars 'tlOrth of twenty dollar bills (T. 27). An 
electronic device was then attached to Shaw's body (T. 32). The 
jevice transmitted sounds originating in the irmnediate area to 
oolice radios (T.33-34) 
Shaw then drove his own car to the Gym, but he was followed 
::1ere by twelve other agents driving another six cars (T. 174). 
Sha•.oJ contacted the appellant at "The Gym" (T. 34). Shaw then 
cestified that some time later a transaction took place in which he 
exchanged the thousand dollars for a package containing a brown 
sabstance (T. 54). When the officers listening to their radios heard 
a prearranged signal from Shaw they arrested Shaw, the appellant 
and the co-defendant, David Ed<tJard Albo (T .185-186). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANT CLAUSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
~ITED STATES CONSTITUTION fu~ ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH PROHIBITS UNAUTHORIZED 
MONITORI':1G BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS OF CONVERSATIONS 
TRA.'l"S:-fiTT'SD BY NEANS OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES. 
The appellant moved to suppress a recording of a conversation 
:e~:;een himself and the State's informant, Kayle Shaw, Jr. (R.54). 
-.~e Jlction was denied and the tape 'N"as received into evidence (T. 333). 
-~e tape -.,as '!lade 'Jy recording a broadcast of the conversation 
The broadcast was heard by some police officers 
~ad f:~ic~ed and were observing Shaw, although there was some 
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The State agents '"'ho '.vere in charge of Sha,.v' s acti.vic'.es 
did not bother to obtain a search '"arrant prior to the transmiss> 
and recording of the conversation. Such a failure violated t~e 
appellant's constitutional protection against unreasonable searc~.e: 
and seizures guaranteed in Article I, Section 14 of the Constit;:t:: 
of Utah and the Fourth Amendment to the Cnited States Constituti.o, 
as it is applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth .-\rnendment. This is not to say that officials canr.c: 
use such devices and make such recordings, but only that before 
doing so, the authorities must obtain a '"'arrant issued on the bas:: 
of a determination by a neutral and detached magistrate after s'lo·-:. 
that there i~ orobable cause to believe that a crime is being or: 
be corrunitted. 
POINT A 
THE FOURTH AJ1ENDME::-JT A!!D ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CTAH PROTECT THE PRIVACY 
OF UTAH CITIZENS AND PROHIBIT THE WARRANTLESS 
SURVEILLA;lCE A::-JD SEIZURE OF THEIR CO~!VERSATIONS 
THROUGH USE OF ELECTRONIC ilEVICES. 
The Fourth Amendment and Article I. Section 1~ of the 
Constitution of C'tah protect privacv of people, not specified p~~ 
Kat:: v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). State v. Kent, :o C: 
2d l. -'d2 P.2d 6C.. (1007) In o:her ·N·orC.s, c::ere is :10 need :or ::. 
pr-i_vacv. 
J~stice Stewa=~ descri~ed 
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I.Jhat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own horne or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Arnendrnent protection. [citations omitted]. 
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in the area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 
[citations omitted] 389 U.S. at 351-352. 
:n a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan gave a more detailed 
:escription of this right of privacy: 
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places." The question, however, 
is what protection it affords to those people. 
Generally, as here, the answer to that quest ion 
requires reference to a "place". My understanding 
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is 
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable". 
389 U.S. at 362 Harlan, J. Concurring. 
In Katz v. United States, supra, the Court held that a 
~e:-son' s conversations were within this expectation of privacy and 
:"e overhearing of such conversations constituted a seizure within 
:~e meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The pro teet ion of this 
osJect of privacy is accomplished by means of the •.varrant clause 
.. t":le Fourth AmEndment (and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution 
Ctah). The purpose of the warrant clause is to place limitations 
··· o::ficial activities. These limitations include: The requirement 
:~a: officials r:1ust present thei:::- estimate of probable cause for the 
:;:ac~ed sc:-utinv of a neut:-al rnag:'..strate. Secondly, during a 
''"'~~. a ·.var:-ant compels o::':"icers to observe precise li:nits established 
Finallv, after :he search has 
- J-
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In Katz v. United States, supra, a transmitter 'N'as ?laced in 
a phone booth enabling police to overhear the defendant's conversath· 
Even though it was operated only when the defendant was using the 
phone and in a limited means, the court refused to uphold the searc1 
stating: 
[T)his Court has never sustained a search upon the sole 
ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence 
of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their 
activities to the least intrusive means consistent with thac 
end. 389 U.S. at 356-357. 
As noted above this Court also recognizes that the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah are 
aimed at the protection of a person's privacy. State v. Kent, supra. 
Furthermore, by enacting Utah Code Ann. §76-9-402 (1973), the State 
legislature has recognized the need to protect the privacy of people. 
This statute provides: 
76-9-402. Privacy violation- (1) A person is guilty of 
privacy violation if, except as authorized by law, he: 
(a) Trespasses on property with intent to subject 
anvone to eavesdropping or other surveillance in a private 
place; or 
(b) Installs in any private place, without the consent 
of the person or persons entitled to privacy there, any 
device for observing, photographing, recording, amplifying, 
or broadcasting sounds or events in the place or uses any 
such unauthorized installation; or 
(c) Installs or uses outside of a private place any 
device for hearing, recording, amplifying, or broadcasting 
sounds originating in the place 'N'hich •,vould not ordinarily 
be audible or comprehensible outside, without the consent 
of the person or persons entitled to pri~acy there 
(2) Privacy violation is a Class 3 ~isdemeanor 
-6-
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An important aspect of this statute is the exception 
of "except as authorized by law". Obviously, this is intended to 
allow such invasions of privacy if done by judicial authorization-
a valid search warrant. 
POINT B 
A CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROt1 WARRANTLESS 
SURVEILLANCE AND SEIZURE OF HIS CONVERSATIONS 
THROUGH USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES IS NOT HAlVED 
MERELY BECAUSE SUCH CONVERSATION IS WITH A 
GOVERNMENT AGENT. 
In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) the Supreme 
Court was faced with a fact situation very similar to the case at 
hand. Four of the justices distinguished Katz v. United States, supra, 
and upheld the search; Justice Black concurred on the basis of his 
dissent in Katz v. United States, supra, (he believed that the Fourth 
Amendment applied only to tangible, not communicative evidence). 
Justice Brennan refused to apply Katz v. United States, supra, 
retroactively, and Justice Harlan authored a strong dissent that 
the two other justices concurred in. 
The basic argument of Justice vfuite's plurality opinion 
is that the petitioner had waived the protection of his privacy 
by talking to a third person, who incidentally was wired to 
broadcast the conversation to government agents. To be able to reach 
this conc~usion the case of Katz v. United States, supra, had to be 
=~sti.nguis:Ced. Justice \•Thite found two disti.r:guishing factors: (l) 
i:J Katz neither :cart? to the conversations kne•.v that the government 
·:as ea·;esdr:-.Jp;:Ji.ng, 3.nd (::) even in Katz there '"'as r.o justifiable and 
:~~s:~:~tional::.· ?rotected ex~ectation that the person with whom 
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one is conversing will not later reveal the conversation to the 
police. To support this second distinguishing :'eat~re Justice :..'hi~e 
cited Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), Lewis v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), and Hoffa v. United States, 385 lJ S. 
293 (1966). The theme that Justice White erroneously extracted 
from these three cases •,vas that the Fourth Amendment does not protec: 
a person from "misplaced confidence" in a friend or infor:ner. 
He then went on to hold that if the conduct and revelations of an 
undercover agent do not invade one's "constitutionally justifiable 
expectations of privacy," then a simultaneous recording or electron:. 
transmission to others likewise does not invade one's privacy. 
Stated otherwise, "a constitutional license to employ secret agents 
generates the correlative right to electronically eavesdrop without 
prior judicial authorization." Collll!lent, Electronic EavesdroopinE 
and the Right to Privac·1, 52 Boston University Law Review 831 (:.9"~1 
There are t·,vo ?roblems •,vith Justice 'N'hite's opinion· The 
:'irst is that he misstated the legal ~asis that leads to his 
conclusion of waiver, the second is that he fails to correctly 
analyze the interests that are at stake. The misstated legal ~asis 
will be discussed first. 
-:'~e case t":;.at Justice ~'.J":-lite c:i..':es :o star:.d for r:--.e ~rc~cs:.::~ 
-3-
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::~e offer. Two of the major factors that the court found to be 
:~e basis of its holding were that at the time the recording was 
jeing made it was not being transmitted to third persons and secondly, 
che defendant had assumed the risk of government intrusion because 
~e was attempting to bribe a person who he knew to be a government 
agent. Obviously, the factual basis of the holding in this case is 
clearly distinguishable from the facts both in United States v. White, 
supra, and the facts in the case at bar. In both United States v. 
:fuite, supra, and in the case at hand the conversations were broad-
cast to third persons and in both there r,vas no expectation of direct 
governmental involvement. 
In both Lewis v. United States, supra, and in Hoffa v. United 
States, supra, the court based its decision on a trespass analysis. 
::,at type of analysis had been strongly rejected in Katz v. United 
S:ates, supra. In Hoffa the court held that an informer who was an 
:~vited guest could not be found to have cor=itted a trespass 
(at t~at time Fourth Amendment questions were anlayzed in terms of 
:::estJass). It is doubtful, hor,vever, under the trespass analysis 
:',at t~e invitation r,vould have extended to uninvited third party 
go•:ernment agents who were listening by means of electronic devices. 
In Lewis v. United States, supra, a government agent purchased 
:3::-cot~cs at the defendant's residence then arrested him. The court 
:.ocd ::Ca: :~e Fourth ,'\.,:nendment does not protect one ·,;ho voluntarily 
::~··er:s a cor.stitutional::.:, protected area into a cor=ercial center. 
~-~s ~ase j~d not ~n 1:olve a~y electronic transmitters or recorders. 
..;; -.l co third parties. It simp l:r 
:cc: a::cD:.~ca"c·:.e as a :.ega::. 'Jasis :'or the 'colding ~n :,.,'"hite v. United 
-9-
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States, supra. 
The analytical problems with White v. United States, supra, 
are discussed in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion. Justice 
White's opinion is analytically incorrect with respect to his 
interpretation of both the orivacy and waiver issues. The privacy 
question will be discussed first. 
The first problem with I.Jhite' s analysis of the privacy issue 
is that the interests simply are not the same when there is 
misplaced confidence in an individual who turns out to be an informant 
and when a conversation is electronically broadcast to third persons 
who are government agents. Typically, when one person engages anot~: 
in conversation there are two considerations: whowill hear the con-
versation and how will the conversation be reported to others. Befori 
entering a conversation of a private nature the speaker will usuallv 
analyze these concerns in terms of his subjective belief that the 
listener will not broadcast the content of t~is conversation to 
others and his knowledge of the credibility of the listener (in 
case the listener does make such a broadcast). If there is a 
substantial risk that conversations expected to be private are 
broadcast to third persons, an individual's freedom to make his 
own choice of who he will speak with and what he will say will be 
substantially impaired. 
Like•t~ise, if people are subject t::J r;;.e fea:c tl":at thei:c 
conversations '.vill 1::le b:coadcast to goverccDen': agents ot:cer i.:1:eresc; 
will be affected. T~ese interests ~ere e~:;,quen:lv descri~ed jv 
Justice Harlan in his disse!lti:l.g O?:!..:l:..cr. :..::. r,-.T':-"'.i':e ·.r. LTni_:ed S::ates, 
-10-
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supra. His description is well worth repeating: 
The impact of the practice of third-party bugging, 
must, I think, be considered such as to undermine that 
confidence and sense of security in dealing with one 
another that is characteristic of individual relationships 
between citizens in a free society. It goes beyond 
the impact on privacy occasioned by the ordinary type 
of "informer" investigation upheld in Lewis and Hoffa. 
The argument of the plurality opinion, to the effect that 
it is irrelevant whether secrets are revealed by the mere 
tattletale or the transistor, ignores the differences 
occasioned by third-party monitoring and recording which 
insures full and accurate disclosure of all that is said, 
free of the possibility of error and oversight that 
inheres in human reporting. 
Authority is hardly required to support the proposition 
that words would be measured a good deal more carefully 
and communication inhibited if one suspected his conversations 
were being transmitted and transcribed. Were third-party 
bugging a prevalent practice, it might well smother that 
spontaneity- reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, 
and defiant discourse- that liberates daily life. Much 
offhand exchange is easily forgotten and one may count on 
the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the very fact 
of a limited audience, and the likelihood that the listener 
will either overlook or forget what is said, as well as the 
listener's inability to reformulate a conversation without 
having to contend with a documented record. All these 
values are sacrificed by a rule of law that permits official 
monitoring of private discourse limited only by the 
need to locate a willing assistant [footnote omitted] 
401 U.S. at 787-789, Harlan J. dissenting. 
Another significant effect of this fear of third person 
1::icial monitoring is that people r,vill lose an important medium 
:·Jr relieving social tension. Tension is often relieved by such 
::~~ngs as making idle threats, boasting about fictitious acts 
J~ even falsely claiming responsibility for the commission of well 
c~]iic:i.zed crimes. I:1 such conversation little harm is done, and it 
3CCr"es as a ~eal thy outlet for various ':ens ions . 3ut if the conver-
<:~Jr. ~s S\.:;:J:Jressed the tensions ·,vill rer:~ain, and these tensions 
7o say :here ~ill ~e a chi~ling e~fect 
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on the exercise of free speech would jean understatement. The 
Or..;ellian nightmare of 1984 will become a cruel reality. In an-; 
conversation it would become reasonable to believe that there 
are government agents listening somewhere. The protection that 
is built into our federal and state constitutions against such 
omnipresence is the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah which prohibits 
searches and seizures without a warrant. The protection simply 
is that government agents must show to a neutral and detached 
magistrate that there is probable cause to believe that a crime 
is being or will be committed before government agents are allc••ed 
to lis~en to a person's personal conversations by means of a 
transmitter attached to the body of an informant. 
Some might argue that the government may act with self 
restraint and resoect for privacy. This argument •,;as expressly 
rejected in Katz v. United States, supra. The Fourth Amendment 
was not premised on good faith and sel:-restraint of the police. 
The Fourth Amendment ·..;as ;ne:nised on the abuses o: po•..;er in King 
George's writs of assistance during Colonial times. The Fourth 
Amendment functions as a check on t':le abuses o: authority and ~he 
·.,;or s t t endanc ies o: go•:ern:ne:1 t. 
With respect tJ t".:"le · . .;a:_~Jer ,:;1.1E3'::.::-:;., .;~s::...:E: ·.-.r.i::e's 3.:1a:··s-
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:~at is used as the model. 'tlith an innocent citizen the risks of 
;~rveillance are not assumed by the actor. The :::isks come to that 
acc:or when the police decide to "bug" an informer. This means 
:hat any unconventional behavior as well as behavior that is on 
:~.e borderline of illegality r.vill arouse the curiosity of the authorities. 
Once that C;..Jriosity is aroused the authorities are allowed to 
ac:ac'l a transmitter to a confidant of the speaker and listen to 
any and all conversations that their suspect engages in. This 
:an be done even if there is little or no reason to believe that 
:1ere is any criminal activity involved. 
Such imposition of hidden and unforeseen risks on the citizenry 
~re expressly prohibited by Katz v. United States, supra. Following 
:~.e analysis in Katz it is reasonable to assume that a person 
s:eaking to another about possible criminal activities subjectively 
:1oes not expect that other person to broadcast the content of the 
:o:wersation to third persons. However, using a reasonable 
Je:son test, it is quite likely that the content of the conversation 
.. ·~~~ l:le told to others. But it is quite unlikely that any reasonable 
:ecson .vould believe that his conversation is being simultaneously 
::oadcast to some government agent listening to his radio in his car. 
c:a:eC: si:rmly, a person does not '"aive his interest that a conversation 
·:::: ~.ot 'Je simu:_taneous:.y 'Jroadcast to gover:1ment agents simply 
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POINT C 
EFFECTIVE POLICE INVESTIGATION IS :--TOT HAMPERED 
BY REQUIRING THAT A 1-IARR.A.:'IT BE OBTAINED BEFORE 
GOVERNMENT AGENTS CAN ENGAGE Hl THIRD PERSON 
MONITORING; CONSEQUENTLY ANY SUCH ~ONITORING 
WITHOUT A \.JARRANT IS UNCONSTITUTI0~1AL. 
In People v. Beavers, 393 Xich. 554, 227 N.\.J.2d 511 (19:; 
the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected Justice White's analysis 
and legal basis in United States v. ~~ite, supra, and held that 
a warrant must be obtained before government agents could monitor 
conversations between an informant and a suspect if any evidence 
of that conversation, other than the informant's version, is to 
be used in court. The Michigan court accepted Justice Harlan's 
view that a person's expectation of privacy should not be subject 
to the possibilitv that communications directed to particular 
persons are simultaneously being intercepted by third party govern,, 
agents. It is also important to note that the Michigan Legislat·Jr; 
has enacted provisions in its penal code 1 that are similar to t~" 
1. for eavesdro in or surveillance oses] Sec. i2:' 
property owned or under the control o any ot.'ler ?ers.· 
to subject that person to eavesdropping or surveil-:..ance is guilty of a misderra: 
§28 807(3) Using derice to eavesdrop upon conversation] Sec. 539c. Any . 
person 'NTIO is present or •Nho is not present during a private conversation and ·.,~: 
·Nilfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon the conversation without the conser.t: 
all parties thereto, or wtlo ~.owingly aids, employs or procures another persoo:: 
the same in violation of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by ~-,;r:' 
in a state prison for not mre than 2 years or by a fine of not roore than S", .f 
both. 
§28.807(4) surveillance or eaveserop in devices] Sec. 539d .:: 
person ·Nho insta ~s in anv private :J ace, ·.ntr.out :0.e consent ot the person or 
persons en~itled to pri•Tacy there, any device ::'or obser;i....'1g, photograDr.:Lcg. ;~ .. 
eavesdroopwg upcn t..'ce sour.ds or events in s:.:ch place, ·or >..;.ses anv s:.:ch ur.au~·-­
i..."':.Stallation, is guil~' o= a :eluny ?unishable '-::;? :i .• ::~r:_s('T'l'::ent in a sta[e ?r:. 5 '-~ 
for not :;x:Jre than ::' years or ':Jy a firte of :cot :>Dre :::.".ar. S:', ·JCO or 'Jot'-: 
- 1:. -
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2 f Ctah Code Annotated §76-9-402 (1973) . 2 The same primary interests 
:eceive protection in both Utah and Xichigan. 
Most of this argument has dealt with the probability of 
aJuse if this type of surveillance is not subjected to the warrant 
:equiremen t. Undoubtedly, the government will argue that this type 
:f surveillance is necessary for police investigation. There is 
~; q;.~estion that this technique is necessary for investigation. 
:cJ'1ever, the government officials are not the people who should make 
::.e determination of which people will be subjected to surveillance. 
:'.e Fourth Amendment requires that such a determination will ultimately 
Je made by a neutral and detached magistrate. The magistrate can 
Ja:<e an objective determination of whether the government agents 
'ave probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed . 
. ~;s is the means by which our founding fathers saw fit to curb the 
a\uses of the English monarchy - such abuses, incidentally, were a 
:ajor cause of the revolutionary r.var. In the case at hand, the fact 
:~at a r,varrant was not obtained must be taken as an admission of 
:ack of ;nobable cause at the time the drug buy r.vas supposed to have 
:a:<e:1 ?lace. The government agents had taken elaborate precautions 
76-9-402. Privacy violation. - (l) 
~r. i~. e.xcept as authorized by law, he: A person is guilty of privacy viola-
. . (a) Trespasses on property ,,;ith intent to subject anyone to eavesdropping 
.: ::.1er survei:..lance in a private place; or 
i.J) Installs b any private place, rNithout the consent of the person or 
:,:acr.s sntit:.ed :o orivacv t:Cere, any device for observing, pr.otographing, 
~:::Leg, arr:pli.:';:iccg, or broadcasti.t<,g sounds or events i.'1 the place of uses 
c" ~(~ .T.ac:t::Cor:.zed installation, or 
'c) bstalls x uses outside of a private place any cevice :or hearing, 
::::..->: . .o::m~i:"-.T-.z, or 'croadcas:i.cg scunds originat:.ng in the place ·Nb.ich 
.. : ·::: -~.:~~~~~-~T>~/~~~~~~_s ::~~.~~~~b~~_s;~~~-a~~t~;;~~ ·Ni~~out ~'ce 
:':":..-,-,3.c- ~c :_lt:.----n i..s 3. c-:..ass 3 ::ri3C.er:teanor. 
-15-
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to set up a drug buy. The buy was set up in advance through the 
informant. (T. 171) The informant was subjected to a skin search 
and search of his vehicle. The electronic transmitter was taped 
to his body. (T. 173) The agents made photocopies of all the 
bills that were to be used in the purchase. (T. 175) The informanc 
was searched a second time, and the money was counted a second time 
when the informant left the gym to get something to eat. (T. 180) 
Finally, there were about a dozen other officers in six cars monitor~ 
the conversation. (T. 174) With all of these elaborate precautions 
the government agents did not see fit to obtain a warrant - a very 
simply procedure if there is in fact probable cause to believe a 
crime is being or <.vill be committed. Stated otherwise, the governmer.: · 
agents took elaborate precautions to protect the interests of the 
State, but did not even take the slightest precaution to protect the 
constitutional rights of the appellant. 
The reasonableness of not obtaining a warrant prior to 
conducting a search is determined by balancing the interests of the 
State against those interests that an individual has in requiring tba: 
a warrant be obtained. State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah, 1977). 
The compeating interests were described in State v. Beavers, supra; 
We are acutelv sensitive to the fundamental interests 
involved when prevailing law enforcement techniques are 
balanced against protections guaranteed cit~zens ~nder _ 
the state and Federal con titutions. Wi:~ the advent or 
increasingly sophisticate electronic sur7eillance equip-
ment, ~he evolving body o law ~hie~ seeks :o reconcile 
the need for e~Eecti7e oo ce investi~a:ive orac:ices i~ 
combatting criminal acciv ~ wi:h the c~i~cus 3oec:re o: 
the Onvellian B:..2 Brot~ler S ~:-aug::c r,.;i :~:. c.J2":p~exities. 
2~7 0T',.J 2d at 51-<~ 
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: 1 resolving these two conflicting interests the Nichigan court 
:~en reasoned; 
Participant monitoring is practiced extensivelv 
throughout the country and represents a vitally important 
investigative tool of law enforcement. Equally significant 
is the security and confidence enjoyed by our citizenry 
in knowing that the risk of intrusion by this type of 
electronic surveillance is subject to the constitutional 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
By interposing the search warrant requirement prior to 
engaging in participant monitoring, the risk that one's 
conversation is being intercepted is rightfully limited 
to circumstances involving a party whose conduct has 
provided probable cause to an independent magistrate to 
suspect such party's involvement in illegal activity. 
The warrant requirement is not a burdensome formality 
designed to protect those who would engage in illegal 
activity, but, rather a procedure which guarantess a 
measure of privacy and personal security to all citizens. 
The interests of both society and the individual should 
not rest upon the exercise of the unerring judgment 
and self-re~traint of law enforcement officials. Our laws 
must ensure that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen may 
continue to engage in private discourse, free to speak 
•,vith the uninhibited spontanceity that is characteristic 
of our democratic society. 227 NW 2d at 515. 
Absent a specific finding of probable cause either in the 
.3SJance of a warrant or in a pretrial suppression motion the seizure 
:::his evidence must be deemed to be unreasonable. Furthermore, 
:::s :ourt is prohibited from reviewing the record at the trial to 
':~.c ?robable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). Consequently, 
:'" :eoe recording used in the trial constituted a violation of 
:·e ?.:J?ellant' s Fourch Amendment rights. The tape must have been 
'~:ressed and the failure to do so requires a reversal of the 
':~:::rendered belo•,v. ~raoo v. Ohio, 367 C:.S. 643 (1961) The case 
·.:: )e reelanded :o c'"'e Third Jistrict Court for a ne•,v trial. 
-17-
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POINT II 
THE APPELLAN'l' S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 't!AS DENIED BY THE 
CUMMULATIVE ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Each of the errors in the following points ·constitutes 
prejudicial error that would require a reversal of the judgment of the 
court below. But these errors must also be considered to have 
had a cummulative effect on the outcome of the trial. Even if the 
individual errors are not prejudicial in and of themselves this 
court may determine if the appellant's case was prejudicial by the 
cummulative effect of the erro State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 
282 P.2d 323 (1955). 
POINT A 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ALLO\HNG 
THE STATE TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS BY THE 
APPELLANT. 
In the course of the direct examination of Kayle Shaw, Jr. 
the prosecutor elicited statements that connected the appellant with 
other bad acts and statements that disparaged the appellant's charact~ 
(T.39, 140 and 142). At no time did the appellant introduce any 
evidence about his character. 
On direct examination of Shaw by the prosecutor, the 
following exchange took place: 
Q: So this conversation took place over about forty 
minutes? 
A: About forty minutes. 
Q: Did vou ~ave any conversation wit~ Boone -- ~r. 3oone 
about pu~chas~ng any other narcotics from him' 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: About w~a~ :~me did :~ac ta~e ~lace in :~e course o: 
these conversations~ 
-18-
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A: About ten to seven. 
Q: And what did that consist of? 
A: Angel Dust. 
Q: And just tell me what you said and what he said. 
A: Can you repeat that? 
Q: Just tell me what you said and what he said. 
A: He told me he still has an ounce of Angel Dust down 
in his crib. 
Q: Now, can you translate that for us what "an ounce 
of Angel Dust in his crib" means? 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, at this point I am going to 
interpose an objection. I have a motion to make outside 
the presence of the Jury. I ask the Court allow us to 
do so at this time. (T. 39) 
As counsel for the appellant pointed out and as is reflected 
~ :~e record, a mistrial had been granted the day before this 
ixc~ange on the basis that Sha'.v had volunteered a statement on cross-
~~~ation that he had purchased narcotics from the appellant prior 
:: :1e date of the purchase that is the subject of this case. 
: :.), R. 50) 
Later, in redirect examination of Shaw by the prosecutor, 
:·., ~allowing exchange took place: 
Q: Could vou have made the buy from Mr. Boone on the 27th 
had vou told him the truth that you were working as an 
undercover agent? 
A: No, I didn't. 
Q: You couldn':: I said, could you have bought from him? 
A· If I told him7 
(I· Yeah. 
A I dou~~ if I ~cu:J ~e alive right now. 
-19-
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MR. KELLER: Your Honor, I object to the response. It's 
unresponsive. It's unduly prejudicial. I have a motion 
to make outside the presence of the Jury and I would ask 
the Court to allow me to do that at the proper recess. 
THE COURT: Very well. The object ion is sustained and the 
answer is stricken and the Jury admonished to disregard the 
answer of the witness. (T.l40) 
Later in redirect examination the prosecutor elicited a statement f~c:J 
Sha•..J that he had fired his attorney because she was working cvith the 
appellant and she said the appellant was going to set Shaw up (T.l42) 
Out of the presence of the jury a motion for a mistrial was denied 
(T.l46). 
With respect to the first statement about the appellant 
possessing other drugs, there was a motion for a mistrial that •.vas 
deC"tied (T.45). In denying the motion the court seAmed to indicate 
that it was improper for the statement to be elicited, but he felt 
that the evidence was not prejudicial (T. 43, 45), the same basis •.vas 
given for the second motion for a mistrial (T.l46). The Court 
did not give any instruction to disregard the statement when the jury 
had returned (T.46, 147). 
The standard for the trial court to use in determining when 
a mistrial should be granted is given in Justice :1aughan' s dissentin; 
opinion in State v. Maestas, 560 P. 2d 343 (Utah 1977). The test is 
Upon a motion for mistrial the court must ·.veigh the dange= 
of prejudice, to tl:l.e defense, against tr.e :::>racticabilitv 
of reducing or eliminating that danger by ~hoosing a . 
new jury. The essence of j~dicial discretion in dealing . 
with a misadvent'-lre is to so manage ::Jatters so as to con:=:. 
the danger of j~rv ?rejudice, to t~e extent :::>racticab:e 
[footr.ote omitted], §560 P.2C. at 3~6. ~aug:Can J. dissen<:::c: 
As for t~e ::anger o: ?:-ejud:.ce, ::::::.e fac:o:-s to cons:,:er ';--
-20-
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~'.e statements about other drugs and firing his attorney appear 
: 2 ".ave been elicited intentionally. Those statements were never 
:::icken and the jury was not instructed to disregard them. Finally, 
~: ~ust be remembered that the statements were made during the testimony 
:: :he first witness. 
Evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs is inadmissible 
.:.:ess it fits within one of the exceptions to that rule. Rule 55 
:::he Utah Rules of Evidence is the codification of that rule. It 
:::vides: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a 
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is 
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime 
or civil 'Nrong as the basis for an inference that he 
committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified 
occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence 
is admissible when relevant to prove some other material 
fact including absence of mistake or accident, motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or 
identity. 
"e Jnly exceptions that fit this case would be to prove intent or 
:~.:.:-,. Both the intent and plan in the case at hand r.vere to distribute 
':c~~rolled substance for value. The statement that the appellant 
" i:c ;:Jossession of a different type of substance has little or no 
::J~at~·:e value in the case at hand. It only shm.;s that the 
:··e::ant ·,vas allegedly violating the law allowing the jury to 
·'e: Jr\ tr.e basis of ::he appellant's bad character that he made the 
-- ~:; ::Ce case at :Cand. r;nder Rule 55 of the Ctah Rules of Evidence 
o· ~dence is c:.eac-l.:; ir.admissible. with respect to the second 
idmi~ted~~ the :curt did all that it could to reduce its 
-2:.--t~ :1a:·-.:.-:::e :;-:-:e:-:':-.e:.ess, t·:-te jur:: did hear the remark and its 
-71 -
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resulting prejudice must be cons ide red in conjunct ion with the pre\·i,1,: 
remark. The substance of the final remark is that the appellant is 
interfering with Shaw's right to counsel. This does nothing but 
cast the appellant in a bad light as the statement would not be 
admissible for any purpose under Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
The case law provides examples of when statements are so 
prejudicial in and of themselves to require the reversal of a case 
on appeal. Evidence that the defendant had been charged with a crime 
in the past, even though never tried on the charge is prejudicial 
error, State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961). Testirnon:' 
about a prior arrest for a similar crime than was charged required 
reversal, State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963). Since 
the statement here involved acts that '"ere illegal and somewhat relac2 
to the charge in the case at hand they were just as prejudicial as t~ 
remarks in State v. Dickson, supra, and State v. Kazda, supra. 
Another factor that substantially contributes to the 
prejudicial nature of the remarks was that some of them had been 
intentionally elicited from the witness. This is easily seen by tte 
context in which they were raised, (T. 39, 142) and the ?rosecutor' s 
arguments to make the statement admissible (T.40-41, 42-43, 144-145). 
The rule given by this court is that a mistrial is to be granted wh~ 
the prosecutor intentionally elicits inadmissible statements from a 
witness. In State V. Hartman, 101 C'tah 298, 119 p 2d E~ c:gc.l), 
this court stated, 
:tJere it shuwn to be an 3.C :e'Jlot: ~o get :.:1 2,/idcnce c~e 
prejudicial ~eference to a:1c~~er :~~~e. s~J2~ ?U~?·:se ~~ 
r.veli. ha,.re klOved ::-..e cour: :J ciecl3.re a. ::.:.s::::-:..~::_ :!.O~ en ... 
on the grounC. o~ ?re~·.J.C:...:e :;~..:.:: a.s 3. ;::-:-2~2:- i:.3a.?;;:-.:'".:3.: 
such tactics 
' ' 
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:-:s r"J1e is followed in State v_ St. Clair, 3 l:tah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 
;:J (1955); and in State v. Case, 547 P. 2d 221 (Utah, 1976). The 
'tate cannot claim that the prosecutor lacked notice. This is because 
, :nistrial had been granted on the previous day because Shaw had 
rde a statement about another drug purchase from the appellant. It 
:5 quite obvious that evidence of a prior sale is much more 
;:o)ative of the intent or plan to sell narcotics then a statement 
a:out present possession of narcotics or that the appellant had 
::.:e:-ferred lvith the witness' relationship with his attorney. 
There was further prejudice because the court failed to 
i:.struct the jury to disregard the first and third statements (T .46, 147). 
~:~ut an instruction of that nature the evidence is left in for the 
::n's consideration, State v. St. Clair, supra. Such an instruction 
a:so tends to cure the prejudicial nature of the statement, State~ 
~. supra; State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P. 2d 1322 (1974). 
The final factor that contributed to the prejudicial nature 
c: t~e statements was the time at which they <,vere elicited. 
The first was elicited in the first several hours of testi-
':r:; (T. 39). The second and third statements came on the morning of 
t·, second day of trial. Since they came at times when relatively 
'·:·> other information had been given to the jury, the appellant 
'" 2ds': in a bad light from the outset. 
'tlhen all of chese factors are taken :ogether, the nature of 
;:a:e:nen:s, the :'.ntentional eliciting of the statements, the lack 
c: >str·..:c:i.Jn from c:"\e cour:: and ::he ti:ne in the trial ""hen they 
~a.:'~. a:~ add·..::: :c ::Ceir ·~eir.g s•_tbs:antially ?rejudicial. 
-?.3-
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Since the statements were made so early in the trial - both were 
made by the very first witness the inconvenience of a mistrial 
would have been minimal". The trial court should have granted a 
mistrial. 
The standard for review of an erroneous failure to grant 
a mistrial was given in State v. Hodges, supra. In that case this 
Court stated: 
Nevertheless, the processes of justice should not be 
distorted simply for the purpose of censuring a mistake. 
the critical inquiry should be whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the incident so prejudiced the jury that 
in its absence there might have been a different result. 
Due to his advantaged position and consistent with 
his responsibilities as the authority in charge of the 
trial, the inquiry is necessarily addressed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. He should view such an 
episode in the light of the total proceeding, and if he 
thinks that there has been such prejudice that there is a 
reasonable probability that the defendant cannot have a 
fair and impartial determination of his guilt or innocence. 
he should of course grant a mistrial. But inasmuch as this 
is his primary responsibility, when he has given due 
consideration and ruled upon the matter, this court on 
review should not upset his ruling unless it clearly 
appears that he has abused his discretion. [footnotes 
omitted] 577 P.2d at 1324. 
With regard to the nature of the discretion of the trial judge, this 
court has stated "if this discretion is reasonably used, and is not 
shown to have been abused, arbitrar:r, or capricious, the judgment 
of the trial court should not be disturbed", [footnote omitted]. 
State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876 (1975) 
The :rial court acted in an arbitrarv and ca~ricicGs ~an~~= 
a mistrial beca~se Kayle S~aw stated t~at ~e ~a~ ~a~e ~ ?~~or ?L~=~~= 
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,; narcotics from the appellant. Such a statement is highly 
J~ejudicial. The effect of the statements here taken standing 
alone or in combination is just as prejudicial as the statement made 
:~at resulted in the first mistrial. The trial court's two decisions 
cannot be reconciled and consequently must be regarded as arbitrary 
l~.d capricious. The judgment must be reversed and the case remanded 
:J the Third District Court for a new trial. 
POINT B 
IN CLOSING ARGG~NT THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT 
BY COMMENTING ON THE APPELLANT FAILING TO TESTIFY AND BY 
PRESENTING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO THE JURY k~D THIS 
MISCONDUCT RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANT. 
In the course of the rebuttal porcion of the prosecutor's 
argument to the jury, the prosecutor made the following remarks: 
[Kayle Shaw]is given his presumption of innocence and that 
rides •,..rith him until he is tried on August the 1st. Counsel 
for some reason opened this and I am even very, very 
reluctant to go into it but it is still open. 
He read the instruction about the defendant not testifying 
and not creating a presumption against him and he said the 
reason •,..rhv the defendant did not testifv -- he said I am 
a skillful prosecutor and I would have had a chance to 
cross-examine him. No question about that. I would suggest 
that maybe that is the reason. I don't know but, you know, 
Kayle Shaw testified and Kayle Shaw was subjected to cross-
examination. Kayle Shaw was subjected to cross-examination 
for almost two and a half hours by two very skillful attorneys. 
He submitted himself to cross-examination and he succeeded. 
Succeeded one hundred percent in that cross-examination. 
Kavle Shaw is a criminal. I don't ~now, ~ecause he had some 
---he wasn't convicted of the offense that he had admitted 
on t~-;e stand ':-~e comr;:itted: ':he ?Ossess:_on of narcotics, 
LSJ. Sixtv-eigh: ~its of LSD is a heck of a lot less than 
a thousand- do::ars of Phencycl~dine, animal tranquilizer, 
as vou heard the chemist testifv. A thousand dollars an 
c~n~~ ~ n, ~c~ ~a~~ times tha~ cou:d be c t and dist=~~uted 
~~d re~~s ~i~~:ed. ~ t~ousand dol:ars a~d t is hard to 
·=c~:...2'"~ :: a~ a~ J•~r.ce of an:r ::.'?€ of -- it s even :nore 
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expensive than gold. Pretty expensive stuff. 
Well, because Kayle Shaw is caught with sixty-eight hits 
of acid in his car and some marijuana he is a "criminal." 
We are dealing, if I can use the phrase, with bigger 
crooks than Kayle Shaw on a thousand dollars an ounce worth 
of PCP or Phencyclidine. (T. 483-484) 
The argument of defense counsel that the prosecutor claimed 
he was responding to was: 
The defendant in any criminal case as the Court has informed 
you has an absolute right not to take the stand and testi0 
if he does not '"'ant to. That's a Constitutional Right and t:. 
Court has instructed you that the mere fact that a defendant 
has not availed himself of the privilege which the law gives 
him should not prejudice him in any way. It should not 
be considered as any indication either of his guilt or his 
innocence. The failure of the defendant to testify is 
not even a circumstance against him and no presumption of 
guilt can be indulged in the minds of the Jury. Why? Becau;, 
a defendant may be satisfied with the evidence as it has 
been presented. The defendant may have other reasons. As 
you can see, Mr. Yocom is a skilled prosecutor, a skilled 
cross-examiner and it is -- there are numerous reasons whv 
the defendant may not want to testify and it is for that · 
reason that the law -- the Court instructs you that the la" 
in our system of justice is that you may not even assume. tha: 
he is guilty because he has not testified. The burden at 
all times remains upon the State. (T.458) 
Although counsel for the appellant did comment on the fact 
that the appellant had not taken the stand, he did so within the 
bounds of Constitutional Law. The prosecutor's comments however, 
were clearly comments intended to cause the jury to draw adverse 
conclusions as to why the defendant did not testify. 
It was an unfavorable comment on the appellant's exercise 
of his Fif:~ Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
-.:'.6-
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In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the 
Supreme Court held that it is a violation of a defendant's Fifth 
.~endment privilege against self incrimination to allow a prosecutor 
:o comment on an accused's failure to testify. The reasons that 
che court gave for this holding were that such a comment, if allowed 
·J:; the courts, becorn.es the equivalent of an offer of evidence; it 
ts also a remanent of the inquisitorial system of justice where an 
accused was forced to testify or face a penalty of contempt. Finally, 
:]e court reasoned that in allowing such a comment the court 
~uld be penalizing a defendant in a criminal case for exercising his 
?i.fth Amendment privilege. 
In State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977), this court 
:o~d that a prosecutor's comments that the defense had not 
J~esented any evidence was a violation of both the Fifth Amendment 
:o the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of 
:~e Constitution of Utah. With respect to a prosecutor's closing 
a~g·.III1ent the court commented, 
We approve and reaffirm that duty and privilege of 
analyzing the whole evidence as a general proposition. 
However, there is a point beyond which it must not 
go in regard to the defendant's constitutional right 
just referred to, and this includes that it should not 
be impaired or destroyed by making comments on the 
failure of the defendant to take the witness stand. 
569 P. 2d at 1116 
The court went on to distinguish the case of State v. Kazda, 
?.2d 949 (Utah 1975). I::1 State v. Kazda, supra, the court 
---~~ :".at the p-::osecJtor has a perogati•1e and a duty to argue 
~-- :S.stJect:s o: ':;:t: -:ase so i.ong as ~~-:ere i.s :10 di:-ect reference ~o the 
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failure to testify. The court then recognized that 
Upon a fair analysis of the prosecutor's remarks 
here, the conclusion cannot be escaped that it was but 
a thinly disguised attempt to do indirectly what the 
prosecutor knew could not properly be done directly: 
that is, to comment on the fact that the defendant had 
chosen not to take the witness stand; and to persuade 
the jury to draw inferences as to his guilt because of 
his exercise of that constitutional privilege. 
[footnote omitted) 569 P.2d at 1116. 
Although counsel for appellant failed to object to this 
comment this court is not precluded from reviewing this issue. T~e 
issue is reviewable with a showing of exceptional circumstances, 
State v. Winger, 26 Utah 2d 118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971). In People v 
Perez, 23 Cal. Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617 (1962), the Supreme Court 
of California listed two circumstances under which it would 
review a statement made in summation for which there had been no 
objection registered. The first of these exceptions arises 
"Where the case is closely balanced and there is grave doub: 
of the defendant's guilt, and the acts of misconduct are 
such as to contribute :nateriallv to the verdict, a miscarr:a: 
of justice results requiring a reversal. [Citations 
omitted) the other exception is where the act done or 
remark made is of such a c~aracter that a harmful result 
cannot be obviated or cured bv anv retraction of counsel 
or instruction of the court .. In such cases t~e ~isconduct 
will furnish ground for reversal of the judgment, even 
where proper admonitions are given by the court" 
373 P.2d at 627 quoting People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 245, 
324 P.2d 556 (1958). 
The harm that results from a comment on a defendant's refusal to 
take the stand is a denial of :Cis Fi:th Amendment pr:.·,ilege agains: 
self incri:nination. Gri.f:in v. Ca~~fcrr.:..a, S 1..2.9ra 
court may instruct the j'....lry to dis:-egard the co-;::rnen~, it still ha.s 
-23-
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a : uror to dis regard such a remark. Consequently, it could be cured 
~.either by a retraction nor by an instruction; such an error is 
rubject to review by this court even if there was no objection 
~egistered at trial. 
Further error was committed by allowing the prosecutor to 
:ead from the transcript of the tape recording of the conversation 
;ec~o~een Kayle Shaw and the appellant. (T.478) Counsel objected to 
this reading (T. 487) because the court had previously refused 
:o admit the transcript into evidence (T. 333). 
As was previously stated, the general rule is that counsel 
:.as both a privilege and a duty to analyze evidence in his argument 
:o the jury State v. Eaton, supra; State v. Kazda, supra; however, 
a corollary to this rule is that counsel may not present matters 
:o the jury which r,vere excluded from evidence. Garris v. United 
3:ates, 390 F.2d 864 (D.C. 1968); People v. Perez, supra; People v. 
',osenfeld, ll N.Y. 2d 290, 183 N.E. 2d 636 (1962); People v. 
\:arthole, 51 Ill. App. 3d 919, 366 N.E. 2d 606 (1977). See also 
·: .i...'TI Jur. 2d 331, Trials §253. 
The reason why such a presentation is not allowed is that 
:.~e jury may infer that this evidence •,vas available and useful 
-- Jrobat:.·,·e, but t:ce defendant has prevented the jury from seeing 
.. ~earbg it. Peoole v. Gilmer, 110 Ill. App. 2d 73, 249 :<.Ed. 
-- ~2~ (1969). -:'he probability that the jurors drer,v this 
:,,a~k ~:cat c:ce avoel:ant ;:ailed ~a c:ake the stand leaves the strong 
- 2 9-
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impression that the appellant was hiding evidence from the jury. 
Such an inference, in the context of a case of this nature, can have 
an extremely prejudicial effect. The test to determine if a 
statement in a closing argument is harmless or prejudicial <!las given 
in State v. Eaton, supra, where the court stated, 
Consistent with the nature of criminal proceedings and the 
protections accorded those accused of crime under our 
law, including the presumption of innocence and the burden 
of the state to prove the defendant's guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we believe that, on appeal, when there 
is a reasonable doubt as to whether the error below was 
prejudicial, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
defendant. This is especially true where the error involved 
is one which transgresses against the exercise of a consti-
tutional right. Consequently, the rule which we have 
numerous times stated is that if the error is such as to 
justify a belief that it had a substantial adverse effect 
upon the defendant's right to a fair trial, in that there is 
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there may have 
been a different result, then the error should not be 
regarded as harmless; and conversely, if the error is such 
that it is clear byeond a reasonable doubt that it was 
harmless in that the result would have been the same, then 
the error should not be deemed prejudicial and warrant. 
granting a new trial. (footnotes omitted] 569 P. 2d at 1116 ( 
Since the appellant's whole defense was that he had been 
set up by Kayle Shaw, the inference that the appellant was trying 
to keep probative evidence from the jury would tend to discredit 
that defense. Since the defense of the appellant was discredited 
by the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the result •t~oul: 
have been different if these errors had not been committed; conseque 
the erc-or 'tlas prejudicial. On this basis, the judgment must be 
reversed and the case remanded to the Third ~istrict Court for a n~ 
trial. 
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POINT C 
BY REFUSING TO REQUIRE A WITNESS' FORMER ATTORNEY TO 
TESTIFY AFTER THE ATTO~~EY CLAIMED THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BECAUSE A CLIENT'S PLAN TO CO~~IT PERJG~Y IS EXCEPTED 
FROM THAT PRIVILEGE. 
In the course of Kayle Shaw's testimony it was established 
:~at he had three charges of aggravated robbery, felonies of the 
~irst degree, pending against him (T.20). It was also established 
that Bradley P. Rich of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
had represented Shaw on these charges (T. 74). Shaw testified that 
he had retained private counsel whom he had just fired (T. 74). 
Shaw also testified that he never stated that he was willing 
to perjure himself (T. 74). The appellant called Mr. Rich as a 
·•i.tness for the purpose of establishing that Shaw had told Mr. Rich 
:hat he (Shaw) was '"illing to perjure himself in trial on the 
aggravated robbery charges (T. 362). Mr. Rich claimed the attorney-
client privilege pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
•T. 364) . The court allowed Mr. Rich to claim the privilege for 
There is no question that the assertion of the privilege 
:1:: '"ithin the general rule described in Rule 26 (1) 3 of the Utah 
1 C"€1l.eral Rule. Subject to Rule 37 and except as otherwise provided by para>?;raph 2 
:: eil.is rule corrrnunications found by the judge to have been beto,.,een lawyer and his 
:::.ent in the course of tb.at relationship and in professional confidence, are privileged, 
'-"c a client has a privilege (a) if he is the •Nitness to refuse to dis ... ~ose any such 
::rt:J.1r1..:.cation, and ('::>) to nrevent his lawyer from disclosing it, and (c) to prevent any 
:c.~e.r ·,~tness from disclosing such corrm..rnication if it carne to tc_l-)e knowledge of 
~-o ·.·:itness \ i) i..'1 the course of its transmittal 'Jetween the client and c.'1e lawyer, or 
::.) in a :r.:mner not reasonably to be anticipated ·"Jy the client, or (iii) as a result 
:: " 'creach of s'-le lavNer-client relationship. The privilege may be clailred by the 
:.~i':'.t ;_,_, oerson ,Jr bv. ':cis '!.awver, or if i.ncorrpetent, by his guardian, or if deceased 
· ·-s :Jersona: reCJresencati·Je·. ;:":"e ::~r:.vilege available to a corporation or association 
:~:-::.._-.a~t2s ~"r. ·Ci Sse lu.tion. 
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Rules of Evidence. Hm.;ever, the privilege may not be properly claime: 
if it fits within one of the numerous exceptions described in ~ule 
26(2) 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The important exception here is 
Rule 26(2) (a) which provides: 
Such privileges shall not extend (a) to a communication if t'. 
judge finds that sufficient evidence, aside from the commu:::. 
has been introduced to warrant a finding that the legal 
service was sought or obtained in order to enable or aid the 
client to commit or plan to commit a crime or a tort. 
It is obvious that in order to assert this exception "the secret 
must be told in order to be kept," but this is a reasonable method of 
reconciling the competing pelicies of the attorney-client privilege 
and the search for truth in a trial, A. v. District Court of Second 
Judicial District, 550 P.2d 315 (Colorado,l976). 
Since perjury is a crime in Utah 5 , the plan to commit perj~,. 
is covered by Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and 
4. Exceptions. Such privileges shall not extend (a) to a corrm..mication if the Juc; 
finds t:hat sufficient evidence aside fran the c0!1111UI'lication, has been introduced to 
warrant a finding t:hat u."le legal service '"'as sought or obtained in order to enable 
said client to cOlii!Iit or plan to cOlii!Iit a crime or a tort, or (b) to a coom.m.icatic: 
relevant to an issue beb'..;een parties all of 'Nhom clai:n t.lu'ough t.'1e client, regardles• 
of,Nhet.'1er the respective claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter 
vivos transaction, or (c) to a coom..;nication relevant to an issue of breach of dut::·: 
lawyer to his client, or by the client to his lawyer, or (d) to a cOllilll..lrli.cation 
relevant to an issue conce..."'Tling an attested docurrent of ·Nhi.c.'1 t.'1e lawyer is an 
attesting witness, or (e) to a COlliD..ll'1ication relevant to a matter of coom:m interes: 
beb'..;een two or rrore clients if made by any of them to a lawyer 'Nhom they have retal:'< 
in cormon ,,;hen offered in an action between any of such clients. 
5. 76-8-502. False or inconsistent material statements.- A person is guilt:: of a:: 
of t."le second degree if in any official proceeding: 
(l) He makes a false material stateriEI'lt under oath or affirmation or 
swears or affinns the ::I"J.t."l of a il'aterial stater;ent :Jrev"ious:, m.de and !"'.e does x: 
believe t."le statem:nt to ':Je tr'J.e; or ' . 
(2) He makes incons ister.t uaterial state!:'E'XS ·_;nder oat."l or aif::..._rmat:.2r 
:,oc..~ '"Nit...l.in. t..'1e period of :.:..:ni.tat:..oc.s, one cf ·,...tc..~ :...s :a.::..3e ar.d :-:.ot ':Je:.:..~/eC. '::: : . .:.: 
to be true. In a prosecut:.on •..:r.der this sect::.or., it ;ceed :'OC be al:_egec or :Jrc·e: 
~.:r.ic~ or the state:rrents is fa2.se jut onl·, !:b..a.~ or.E: :-r -:::--.e ct~er · .. .ras ~alse and :-:ct: 
believed bv the defer'.dant to ':Je tr'J.e. -
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::~.sequently is not pri?ileged. The only previous occasion that the 
::ah Supreme Court has had to rule in this question was in People v. 
~ l Utah 205 (1875). In that case, the defendant claimed error 
:"a~se an attorney ·.vas required to testify about a plan to commit forgery 
::.at the defendant had consulted the attorney about. The court held 
::.a:: :;he attorney-client privilege could not be asserted. The court 
;:ated the general rule that "confidential communications between the 
cocney and client are not to be revealed at any time" l Utah at 208, the 
::::-: then reasoned: 
But do all matters come within the scope of professional 
employment? Are there not matters of such a nature, that 
the law will not permit the relation of Attorney and Client 
to exist in regard to them? While a member of the Bar may 
be Counsel for, and keep the secrets of, one who has committed 
a crime, can he be permitted to sustain any such relation 
to one who proposes to commit a crime? Were he to attempt 
to give aid and assistance, in the case last approved, 
would not the law regard him as an accessory before the 
fact, rather than as a Counselor at Law? Is it not the duty 
of a ~ember of the Bar, as much as of any other citizen, 
to expose contemplated crime, so as, if possible, to prevent 
it 1 'Jhat do the books sav? 
Lord Chief Baron Gilbert says: "Where the original ground 
of communication is malum in se, as if he be consulted on an 
intention to commit a forgery or perjury, this can never be 
incl~ded ~i:::hin the compass of professional confidence; being 
equally contrary to his duty in his profession, his duty as 
a citizen, and as a man." (l Gilbert's Law of Ev. 277). 
1 Utah at 209 
!!ore recently, in State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P. 2d 
:0~J). :he Supr-eme Court of Kansas found there was no ·1iolation 
: =~e a:::or:1ev-c::_ient pri·.:ilege •.vhen the court-appointed attorney 
~ed :he Cour: cha::: his client ~as ~ncooperat:ive and planned to 
- 3 3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
We perceive nothing violative of the confidentiality 
inherent in the attorney-client relation by Mr. Anderson's 
making known to the court defendant's avowed intention 
of presenting perjured testimony. \fuile as a general rule 
counsel is not allowed to disclose information imparted 
to him by his client or acquired during their professional 
relation, unless authorized to do so by the client himself 
[citation omitted) the announced intention of a client 
to commit perjury, or any other crime is not included 
perjury, or any other crime, is not included within the 
confidences which an attorney is bound to respect. 
468 P.2d at 141 
This evidence was obviously admissible because its purpose 
was to impair the credibility of a witness6and in the course of his 
testimony that witness had denied making such a statement (T.72) 7 
Consequently it was error for the court to allow Mr. Rich to assert 
the attorney-client privilege, thus preventing the appellant from 
effectively impeaching the credibility of ti:l.e State's pn.mary witness. 
The error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable 
likelihood that if it had not been committed the verdict may have bee,. 
different, State v. Eaton, supra. This is because the appellant.' s 
defense was that he did not sell the narcotics to Kayle Shaw, rather. 
he was collecting a past debt from Shaw. In order to do this it was 
crucial that Shaw was shown to be a person who's testimony completel:' 
lacked even a modicam of credibility. To do this it was of the utmos: 
importance that the appellant be able to show that Shaw was willing 
to perjure himself. After making this showing the inference could ·JE 
that Shaw was willing to be under oath; therefore, he would be more 
6. RUle 20 of the Utah Rules of Ev~dence: Subject to ?ules 21 and 22, for c~e ~ 
of i:npairing or supporting t.h_e credibility of a ,,n_!:J",ess, omy oart:J incl•...Cing t."e =~ 
calling him may e..xarrrine hi.tn and i.r1::roduce extr::.."'lSic ev'_dence concerni.:cg ar.y sca~c:e 
conduct b:r him and omv ot.'1er :natter relevant ·~pen t.ke i.ss"-es of credi.b:.:.::.tv. 
Rule 22(b) of the etah ~2s o-: Evidence. Exc:-i:""..si.c e-.:i~ence 0f 'Jricr cor:r:-;;.C~: 
stata:nents, ~. .. net..,_,_er oral or ~.vritten, mde ~~;r t'l:.e ~, .. rJ..~.ess, ::ia .. ~ ~L c.t:e di.sc::-eti:--r :: 
juCge ~e e...xcluded :...rnless tl:e ":-.~i.tness ~.-vd..S so ~x.a:rc-.i...:.eC. ·.~;~.:_:e :eSc:.::-·:i_·-·::;: :S..S :::: ;i· e 
opportcnitv to identify, e..xplain or den:; the staterre.st 
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::,an 1Jilling to lie about buying drugs from the appellant, that 
:~.:erence may have been enough to create a reasonable doubt of the 
aJnllant's guilt in the minds of the jurors. The error was 
Jrejudicial, absent this error there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
•:erdict may have been different. The judgement must be reversed 
and the case remanded to the Third District Court for a new trial. 
POINT D 
THE FAILURE TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT 
TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF A CRUCIAL WITNESS DENIED THE 
APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS FOR WITNESSES 
AS GUARN~TEED IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
In the course of re-direct examination the prosecutor elicited 
::1e follo·.ving testimony with respect to the aggravated robbery charges 
:hat the witness, Kayle Shaw, was facing at the time: 
Q: And what was the name of your lawyer at that time? 
A: Carolyn Nichols. 
Q: And did you have personal contact with her at that time? 
A: Yes. 
Q: .~~d why did you discharge her at that time? 
A: She was defending Louis Rashado, somebody I had set up. 
Q: Has Mr. Rashado been charged with the distribution of 
narcotics also? 
A: Yes. 
Q: .~~d s'->.e is representing ~im? 
A: Yes. 
Q ~as :~ere an~ o:her reason t~at you fired her other than 
th~s ~on::ic~ of in:erest: 
·-' '{ e s 
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Q· And what's that? 
A: Because I though she would be a setup because she 
has been talking to Mr. Boone and several other people. 
Q: Did she inform you of that? 
A: Yes. (T. 142) 
On re-cross examination, counsel for the appellant estabLs· 
that Shaw and his attorney were the only persons ?resent when the 
witness decided that she was going to set him up. (T.l54) Shawalsc 
denied that his attorney had accused him of lying to set people up. 
(T.lSS). It was also established that the subject matter of these 
conversations would affect the determination of the guilt or innocence 
of the appellant and of the co-defendant, Albo (T.lSS). Kayle Shaw 
then expressly waived any privilege he had with respect to the confi-
dent:iality of these communications with his attorney (T.l64). Al~ o: 
this testimony was taken on Wednesday, June 15, 1977. The next day, 
Thursday, June 16, 1977, counsel for the appellant moved for a conti~:·: 
unt:il Monday, June 20, 1977. (T. 401) The basis for the motion ·,.;as :: 
secure the attendance of Carolyn Nichols, the attorney •,vith •,vhom Kav:e 
Shaw had the aforementioned conversation. Ms. :-Echols \vas in Texas 
and therefore unavailable until June 20, 1977 (T. 401) The Clotion 
was denied (T. C.OS) after arguments, the jurv retired for 
their delioerations on t:1e afte::-noon of Fridav, J•.me ::.:, 1977. 
In Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66 (A:.as;za, 1976), c:'le Su~:-2:E 
Court ,Jf Alas~a ruled o~ a si:,Jaticn ~ .... t-.; ... 1--. ~:as ::--.e sJ.:::;.e as ........... ,.., ..... .;.,... 
..... u::.- -·· 
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·;:~-e they r.vere driving in the area. The t<.vo of them then removed 
52ce articles from the burned out car. The state's theory was that 
:>.e defendant knew where the car was and directed his friend to it. 
:>e ~riend testified that he did not see the car at the place where 
::.e :lefendant saw it. 
3".: 
CE 
:':' .. ~ 
The defendant disclaimed any knowledge of the homicide, 
d testified that he could see the burned out car from the road. 
5:~ce the cvreckage had been moved, a police officer 'dho conducted 
r:.e investigation '.Vas called by the defendant to give the exact 
.ccation of where the car r.vas found and he testified that it could 
:e seen from the road. The officer's attendance could not be secured 
:::::~edi.ately because he was out of tor..rn and was unable to fly to 
::.e location of the trial due to bad weather. The trial was continued 
'" one day, but the weather did not break and the court refused 
::~ant any further continuances and the trial was concluded. The 
:::en:lant <.vas convicted as charged. After analyzing a great number 
,_ :: cases the Alaska court found seven factors that must be met before 
·' 
':cu:-: grants a :nid-trial continuance to secure the attendance of a 
··~:~.ess These fac~ors are: 
l. The evidence must be rnaterial;8 
The evidence cannot be e:icited from any other source, 
-3 ~ -
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3. The evidence must not be cumulative; 
4. It is probable that the witness can be secured in a 
reasonable time; 
5. There wil~ be little inconvenience to the court and to 
others; 
6. The requesting party must have acted dilligently and is 
9 good faith to secure the attendance of that witness, and 
7. There is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony 
10 
would affect the .iury's verdict. 
The Alaskan court found that all these factors were present. On 
that basis the court held that the de:endant's Sixth Amendment 
;:ight to have compulsory process was denied because he was not allo:;, 
to call favorable witnesses, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) 
The materiality of t:he testimony that Ns. Nichols would g.i·:1 
was established by Kayle ShaT..J. He stated the kno1-1ledge that Ms 
;lichols had would probably affect the deter.:Jination of the guilt a: 
innocence of the appellant (T. 155). Furthermore, such evidence "c~. 
be considered for substantive purposes rather than for simply asses:. 
9. R.equiranent given in State v. Freshw-ater, 30 L't:ah 442, 8 5 P.447 (1906) 
10. This is t:he general standard for prejudice, State v. Eaton, supra. 
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Shaw's credibility, as is made clear in the note following 
Rule 63(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Shaw also testified that he and Ms. Nichols were the only 
persons present during the course of the conversation (T.l54). 
Consequently, there were no alternative sources of information. 
M$. Nichols' testimony would not have been cummulative. 
There had been no showing that Shaw had made other prior 
inconsistent statements. 
By allowing Xr. Rich to claim the attorney-client privilege 
the court has previously prevented the appellant from showing 
that Shaw had made such statements. 
The witness could have been served in a reasonable time. 
As noted above the appellant made the request on Thursday, June 
16, 1977; the witness would have been available on Monday, 
~une 30, 1977. Since the courts are not open on Saturday and 
Sunday, Friday, June 17, 1977, would have been the only day that 
"he trial would have to have been continued. \fuat amounts\ to a 
one dav delay is hardly unreasonable. The reasonableness of 
=~ls delay is reinforced if this court takes judicial notice, 
-39-
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pursuant to Rules 911 and 12(3) 12 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
of the fact that it is a common practice in the Third Judicial 
District to continue a trial from Thursday to Monday if the 
judge hearing the case is to take the arraignment and sentencing 
calendar on Friday. 
These same considerations apply to the inconvenience that a 
continuance over a Friday would cause to the court and to others. 
ll. Rule 9: (l) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party, of the 
comron law, constitution and public statutes in force in this state, and of such 
specific facts and propcsitions of generalized knowledge as are so universally 
known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. 
(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party, of (a) the 
comron law, constitution and public statutes of every other state, territory and 
jurisdiction of the United States, and (b) private acts and resoluttions of the 
Congress of the United States and of the legislature of this state, and duly enam 
ordinances and duly published orders, rules and regulations of governmental 
subdivisions or departments or agencies of this state (and duly published orders, 
rules and regulations of the departments or agencies of the L'nited States) , and 
(c) the laws of foreign countries, and (d) suc..'l facts as are so generally known o: 
of such comron notoriety 'Nithin the territorial jurisdiction of the court that the: 
cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute, and (e) specific facts and propositi!:' 
of generalized knowledge <Nhich are capable of imnediate and accurate dete=inatior 
by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy. 
(3) Judicial notice shall be taken of each matter specified in paragranr. 
(2) of this rule if a party requests it, and (a) furnishes the judge sufficient 
i..'1formation to enable him properly to comply with the request and (b) has given 
each adverse party such notice as the judge may require to enable the adverse 
party to prepare to meet the request. 
12. Rule 12(3): The reviewing court in its discretion may take judicial notice 
of any matter specified in Rule 9 whether or not judicially noticed by the judge. 
- .c.o -
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;:1 State v. Salazar, supra, this consideration ~o1as weighed against 
:~e possible prejudice to the defendant's substantive rights. The rights 
involved here as rJere involved in State v. Salazar, supra, are the 
a?pellant's Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process of Law as that 
clause applies the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment 
of the United State's Constitution to the states and the rights 
~aranteed in Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. 
~questionably, a one day delay does not so seriously affect the need 
for efficiency and prompt disposition of criminal cases that these 
substantive rights must be denied. 
Also, there is no question that the appellant acted dilligently 
a~ in good faith in trying to secure the atte~dance of the witness . 
.-\n attempt to subpoena Ms. Nichols 'N'as made on the same afternoon 
of the date that Kayle Shaw testified and the need for Ms. Nichols 
co testify 'N'as made apparent. (T.401) The continuance was 
requested the day following the attempt to subpoena Ms. Nichols. 
It hardly ·.vould have been possible for the appellant to act more 
:illigently in trying to secure the attendance of this witness. 
Finally, there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony 
·.could have affected the jury's verdict. As has previously been 
orgued, by pre'renting the appellant from challenging the credibility 
·: l(.av~e Sha•.v the trial court denC:.ed the appellant his only defense; 
=~at 'Jeing ~hat Kavle Sha•.v had lied about l:Juying drugs from the 
~=:e::an~ and ~as repayC:.ng the appellant for an old debt. The prior 
.~::::s:s:c?nt 3ca:e:nents :v·ould a2.lo•.v the jury to see tl:'lat Shaw must 
., .. , '·2-on :.·:'.n.; :'.Cl '!laking at :!.eas:: one of the i:1consistent statements 
::. ::2o -::-_:_;;, :':-:c j IJ.::'? :::1ay i:-tfe;:- ~':-:.at SharN ~·las l?i:-tg a:,ol..lt ':>uying 
- .......... -
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narcotics from the appellant. The evidence would also have been 
considered substantively in determining the guilt or innocence of 
the appellant. Obviously there is a reasonable likelihood that this 
testimony may have affected the jury's verdict. 
Since all the factors delineated in State v. Salazar, supra 
have been met in the case at hand, the appellant has been 
denied his right to call favorable witnesses as required by the 
compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United State 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. 
Washington v. Texas, supra. The judgment and verdict must be 
reversed and the case remanded to the Third District Court for a 
new trial. 
POINT E 
THE CUMMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED ERRORS 
RESULTED IN A DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR 
TRIAL. 
In State v. St. Clair, supra, this Court found that when 
a trial court commits a number of errors which if singlely considere 
are insufficient to •,.;arrant reversal, the c=ulative effect of thes 
errors was prejudicial. The individual errors in that case include6 
An expression of a preconceived notion of the defendant's guilt by 
t~e judge: a ::efusal to allow the defenda0t' s counsel to show t':le ~i 
of a key prosecution •,.;i:ness; a refusal :o ad::~::..:: evidence conce:r:ci~.i 
the relationship bet•,.;een t':1e defendant and t':1e victim of the 
"lomicide: a failure ::o instr'.lC: t"le jur:: :o d::..s::egard sta:ements -
- ~2 -
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eliciting of an inadmissible statement from a witness by the prosecutor; 
and an unreasonable time limitation on closing arguments. 
The errors in the case at hand are analogous to a number 
of those errors in State v. St. Clair, supra. There were three 
:Estinct groups of errors in this case. The first group of errors 
~nvolve statements made by Kayle Shaw which constitute prior bad 
acts by the appellant. Although the court seemed to indicate that 
e:ror had been committed there was no instruction given to preclude 
the jury from considering the evidence. At least two of these 
statements had been intentionally elicited by the prosecutor. 
The second group of errors involves the prosecutor's closing 
arguments where he made adverse comments about the appellant 
exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination; 
and ~<~here he presented evidence to the jury that had been held 
i:1admiss ib le. 
The final group of errors precluded the appellant from 
i~peaching Kayle Shaw on the basis of prior inconsistent statements. 
~c t:rror occurred when the court allowed Kayle Shaw's court-appointed 
;e actorney to assert the attorney-client privilege when an exception 
:o that IJrivilege applied. The court also refused to grant a very 
'~ort c:Jntinuance to all01v Kayle Shaw's other attorney to testify 
k aoo<.:: a conversation she had '.Vith Sha·.v. The prosecutor had elicited 
;:a:eme"lts :'rom Shaw about that conversation. 
If as a result of these errors there is a reasonable likelihood 
'a· ::ce ~ur:1's ·:er-d:.ct ·.·JOuid have '::Jeen different, then t!le error 
?:~; :.:'::.:i3.l. As :Cas been pointed out in detail, :he effect of 
- -+3 -
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the errors was threefold: First of all, the appellant '.vas r:1ade 
out to be a man with a bad reputation who kept large quantities of 
narcotics at his residence, who would possibly kill the witness 
and who would interfere with the right to counsel of a witness who 
was facing three first degree felony charges. Secondly, the 
prosecutor made it appear that the appellant was willing to keep 
probative evidence from the jury by not testifying and by not 
allowing the jurors to read a transcript of the tape recording 
of the alleged transaction. Finally, the appellant was not allowed 
to impeach Kayle Shaw on the basis of prior inconsistent statements 
The first set of errors enables the jury to make the infere 
that the appellant is a bad person therefore he must have sold 
these narcotics. The second set of errors encourages the jury to 
believe that the appellant is preventing them from considering 
probative evidence. The third set of erros prevented the jury from 
adequately assessing Kayle Shaw's credibility. 
The appellant's defense was that Kayle Shaw had lied about 
narcotics sale, and that Shaw was repaying an old debt. The first 
part of this defense was severely impaired by the errors that 
precluded the jury from assessing Kayle Shaw's credibility. The j~: 
being allowed to infer bad acts from the appellant's prior bad 
acts may prevent the jury from believing the part of the defense 
explaining why the apoe~lant had the s:ace's ~cnev. There is a 
similar result from t~ose er~ors ~hie~ allow :~2 j~ry ~o co~c:~de 
that the appellant is hiding some:hing. 
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.. 2 rdict. The judgment in the court belo•,o~ must be reversed and the 
:ase remanded to the Third District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of the tape recording of the transaction between 
::1e appellant and Kayle Shaw violated the appellant's rights guaranteed 
c:: the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I 
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah which resulted in a denial 
:f defendant's right to a fair trial. When the cu.mmulative effect 
Jf these errors is considered the reversal of the trial court's 
>dgment is mandated. 
DATED this day o£ March, l978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LARRY R. KELLER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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